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Abstract 
 
 
  Despite enhanced powers and the experience of four direct elections, the European Parliament's 
potential for reducing the European Community's democratic deficit remains in doubt. Diffuse support 
for the European Parliament is evident, but is support grounded in knowledge of the EC?  We develop 
and test two models using multiple regression with data from Eurobarometer 37 (1992) on five EC 
member states:  Britain, Denmark, France, Germany and Italy.  The first model employs indicators of 
socio- economic status, media reliance and political interest to predict citizen knowledge of the 
European Union.  Political interest, gender and awareness of the EC's importance are the most 
powerful predictors of knowledge, but there is wide variation in the importance of other predictors 
across the five countries.  The second model attempts to explain citizen support for the European 
Parliament using knowledge levels in addition to the predictors used in the first model.  General 
support for European integration and awareness of the EC's importance are the most potent predictors 
of EP support.  With the exception of Germany, knowledge of the EC is unrelated to support for the EP.  
Media exposure is associated with knowledge, but not support.  Overall, support is a function of 
general disposition toward the EC which is unrelated to knowledge.  Our findings suggest a daunting 
prospect for those who hope to strengthen informed public support for the EP as a means to closing the 
democratic deficit. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
  After four rounds of direct elections for the European Parliament (EP), European publics' 
awareness of the institution does not appear to have increased.1  This despite substantial increases in 
the powers of the European Parliament stemming from the Single European Act and the Maastricht 
Treaty (Duff 1994). 
  About half those surveyed shortly before the 1994 European elections reported having seen or 
heard something about the  
European Parliament in the media, but only 22% knew the correct date of the 1994 EP elections 
(Eurobarometer 41 Report, 5).  By 55% to 37%, respondents said national issues were more likely than 
European ones to affect their vote in EP elections. Nevertheless, a plurality (44% to 33%) reported 
they would like to see the EP's powers expanded.  There is even stronger sentiment for having EU 
Commissioners made accountable to the EP. 
  Beyond the public, controversy is widespread among European Union elites--officials, 
parliamentarians and academic experts-- about the present and future roles of the EP (Shackleton 
1994a, 1994b).  Changes in the EP's composition, i.e., the move from a membership composed of 
national parliamentarians to directly elected Euro-MPs, and the EP's increased powers were viewed by 
some as the means to remedy a looming democratic deficit.  Others saw these changes as creating a 
rival to national parliaments in the oversight of other EC/EU institutions without offering a stronger 
basis for the legitimacy of European actions.  Overall public support for the EU has shown some 
decline during the past three years, reversing the general trend of preceding decades. Some national 
governments and national legislators have expressed a preference for re-nationalization of EU 
functions in their discovery of the principle of "subsidiarity."  Other voices express fear that increasing 
the power of the EP is a long step toward the creation of Washington-style "gridlock" ("Capitol Hill Comes to Europe").  These developments imply that the EP may have to fight hard to retain its present 
powers, let alone have them  
extended. 
  Our paper is concerned with citizens' knowledge of European institutions and decision processes, 
and how that knowledge is related to expressed levels of citizen support for the European Parliament.  
It is well known that there are significant national variations in support levels for European integration 
and in perceptions of the values of membership (Inglehart 1990, 417-421; Gabel and Palmer 1993).  
Do these differences reside in variations in knowledge?  Do the same factors affect knowledge across 
member states?  Does it matter for their knowledge, perceptions and support levels what sources 
citizens use to acquire information about the EP and the other European institutions?  Critically 
important, what are the implications of these factors' impact on citizens' perceptions of Parliament as 
an institution worthy of their support?  If the EP is to help legitimate EU actions and thereby contribute 
to closing the democratic deficit, would it not be in a better position to do this if its support rests on a 
foundation of knowledge rather than on an undifferentiated "feel good" factor which could be subject 
to short-term, radical change? 
 
 
The Democratic Deficit 
 
 
  Both public opinion and elite perspectives suggest a mixed picture for those who have hoped that 
an enhanced EP would remedy the EU's democratic deficit.  Finding a remedy, of course, requires a 
diagnosis of the problem.  Recent literature on the democratic deficit reveals many perspectives on its 
nature.   
Neunreither (1994, 300) identifies several:  the failure of the EU's institutional system to comply with 
democratic norms, the imbalance between the (limited) powers of the parliament and those of other EU 
institutions, and the weakness of intermediate structures which might otherwise link EU institutions to 
the people of the EU, especially the absence of genuinely European political parties and a European 
media .  Additional diagnoses of the problem include the absence of transparency in EU decision 
processes (Lodge 1994, 345), the technocratic, elitist conception of the Commission (Featherstone 
1994, 150-151), and the failure of national parliaments to hold their governments accountable or 
otherwise effectively scrutinize European activities (Duff 1994, 161-164).  
  The failure of a European "body politic" to develop is of particular interest.  Many barriers to such 
a development are inherent given differences of language, national histories, and the continued 
primacy of national political matters (Malcolm 1995, 64-65).  Beyond these are EU and national 
government practices which have limited the development of a democratic space in which a European 
citizenship could flourish (Meehan 1993, 154-156).  
  Regardless of which barriers are more important, in the democratic societies of Europe, 
acceptance and support by the citizenry is a sine qua non both for the legitimacy of the European 
Parliament and for its capacity to diminish the Union's democratic deficit.  Legislatures typically have 
been seen by  
political theorists, politicians and publics as distinctive, even pivotal, political institutions of liberal 
democracy.  Although the EP continues to lack some of the attributes of national legislatures, research 
on national legislatures offers some guidance for understanding the EP's potential to close the 
democratic deficit.  
  A crucial factor affecting the quality of representative government is constituents' knowledge of 
the legislature, its members, and where the legislature fits in the system of government.  If citizens are 
to exercise control through the legislative system and have a say in the course of policy, they must 
have some elemental understanding of it.  The quality of democratic politics diminishes if citizens are 
ignorant.2  Yet for most people, most of the time, politics is of tertiary importance and the costs of 
becoming informed outweigh the perceived benefits.  Therefore, "voters are no fools to remain 
ignorant" (Converse, 1975, 96). 
  If lack of support for the EP is concentrated among the least knowledgeable--who are less likely to 
participate in politics--then its impact may be slight.  On the other hand, if support for the EP is lowest 
among those who are most knowledgeable--who are also most likely to have an impact on the political 
process--then the prospects for the EP as a remedy for the democratic deficit may be bleak.   Prior research on the causes of political information and sophistication suggests that basically 
three factors affect  
political awareness:  cognitive ability, opportunity, and motivation.3   Those with more "cognitive 
ability," whether measured in terms of formal schooling or "intelligence," are better informed about 
politics than those with less.  People with greater opportunity to acquire political information, usually 
because they are better situated within the social structure and/or because they are exposed to more 
information flowing through media channels, typically know more about politics than those less 
favorably located.  Finally, the more people are motivated to learn, the more they know. 
 
 
Models of Knowledge and Support 
 
 
  Working from this base of understanding we have developed two models.  The first attempts to 
predict citizen knowledge of the European Union.  The second attempts to predict citizen support for 
the European Parliament.  Ideally, our first model would focus specifically on citizen knowledge of the 
European Parliament.  However, the data available to us do not include a sufficient number of 
knowledge items on the Parliament itself. We have blended those available into an index which 
includes several knowledge items relating to other EU institutions.  (See appendix for an explanation 
of how the knowledge index was constructed.)  We have confidence in making the connection between 
general knowledge of the EU and knowledge of the EP because research elsewhere has shown that the 
same factors affecting political information in general are also powerful predictors of what people 
know about the legislature in  
particular (Bennett and Bennett 1993). 
Knowledge Model 
  Our knowledge model incorporates four classes of predictors. The first set are variables usually 
included in political information models:  education (which taps cognitive ability and motivation), age, 
gender, occupation, and family income (which encompass aspects of location in the social structure 
that affect opportunity).  The second class are media exposure indicators of reliance on newspapers, 
television, and radio for political information (which plumb opportunity and, to a lesser degree, 
motivation).  The third includes several variables that may affect people's motivation to acquire 
information:  partisanship, ideological position, and general political interest.  This class assumes that 
those who are more politically involved and interested in public affairs are more likely to be politically 
knowledgeable than the apathetic.  The final set enable us to examine the impact of general awareness 
of the EU and general support for it on knowledge.4  Presumably, the aware and supportive have both 
opportunity and motivation to acquire information.  
Support Model 
  The knowledge model predictors plus the knowledge indicator are then employed in our second 
model as predictors of support for the European parliament.  The key question we seek to address 
through this model is whether those who profess support for the EP know much about it.  The literature 
of public opinion and the  
EU suggests how the elements in our model may work.  There is substantial evidence that younger, 
better educated, more affluent citizens in professional and managerial occupations have tended to 
support European integration (Inglehart, Reif and Melich 1992).  But does this mean people with these 
characteristics will support the EP also?   
  Our model also enables us to test the impact of media exposure on generating support for the EP.  
Television's impact is of special interest here because the proportion of those watching the news on TV 
"everyday" has been rising steadily since Eurobarometers began tracking it in 1980, from 60% then to 
75% in spring, 1994 (Eurobarometer 41 Report, 9). 
  The political variables in the model enable us to test the impact of partisanship on support for the 
EP.  Citizens often have developed their personal positions on European integration from cues 
provided by the parties with which they identify (Flickinger 1995).  Does this carry over to the EP?  
While political interest per se should not be expected to lead to support for the EP, it may be associated 
with acquiring knowledge, which in turn may shape attitudes toward the EP. Ideology has sometimes 
been linked to support/opposition to European integration.  Leftist opponents have characterized the EC/EU as a bastion of capitalism while their conservative counterparts have criticized it as a haven for 
socialists and bureaucratic regulators. 
  Awareness of the EC/EU and general support for European  
integration are incorporated into the model to see what extent these general traits translate into support 
for a specific European institution.  We expect that they will.  But there are theoretical reasons for 
believing they may be distinct, e.g., one may support the EC without supporting the Parliament if she 
fears growth of the EP would undermine the European role of the national parliament. 
  Lastly, the inclusion of the knowledge index as a predictor is vital to assessing the basis of support 
for the EP.  Certainly one may support EC without knowing much about it (Janssen 1991, 467).  Does 
support rest on the foundation of an informed citizenry?  Or on wishes and hopes?  Or on cues from 
elites? 
Data Source 
  The data for the initial test of these models were drawn from Eurobarometer 37, a survey 
conducted during the spring of 1992 (Reif and Melich 1993b).  Although Eurobarometers generally 
have some limitations for comparative research (Katz 1985; Schmitt 1989), they offer the advantage of 
a standard set of survey items asked of respondents from different countries.  This enables us to avoid 
the pitfalls of trying to construct comparable measures from different national surveys.  One may argue 
that it would have been preferable to use Eurobarometers done at the time of a European election.  We 
considered those for 1989 and 1984 but found that they contained fewer indicators for the variables of 
interest to us, especially those for knowledge of the European Community (Rabier 1986, Reif and 
Melich 1991 and  
1993a).  With attempts to secure the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty in full swing, Eurobarometer 
37 was conducted at a period of somewhat higher than normal interest in European affairs.  More 
importantly, it contained a reasonable set of indicators for the predictors we posited in our model.  We 
believed that it would best suit our needs for this preliminary excursion into the popular bases of 
support for the EP. 
Explanation/justification of choice of countries 
  Rather than do a single analysis combining all twelve EU member states, we have chosen to do 
separate analyses of five member states:  Britain,5 Denmark, France, Germany, and Italy. This 
approach has two advantages.  First, it allows more discrete tests of our models.  Second, it gives us 
the opportunity to explore national differences.  This is especially important given evidence that 
citizens' attitudes toward EC matters are influenced significantly by national politics (Franklin, et.al. 
1994).  
  Our country cases include two original members, Germany and France, whose governments and 
people have been supportive of European integration.6  France and Germany generally have been near 
the European average of support for integration 
between 1981 and 1994. On the other hand, Britain and Denmark could be characterized as latecomers 
whose governments and publics have been persistent skeptics in matters European. Britons have been 
consistently below the European average, though support grew steadily from the early 1980s to the 
early 1990s  
before tailing off (as has support in most countries in the 1990s).  Danes were much below the 
European average until 1992, when they actually went above it before settling to the average since. 
Italy is an original, generally pro-integration member; 
Eurobarometer time series show clearly that Italians have been consistently above the European 
average in seeing the EC as a "good thing".  Italy's serious legitimacy problems for its national 
government allow us to entertain the proposition that domestic dissatisfaction may lead people to pin 
their hopes on European solutions to problems.  Italians have had the highest turnout rates in the four 
European Parliament elections, Britons the lowest followed by the Danes.  German and French turnout 
has been near, but slightly below the Euro average (Guyomarch, 1995; Flickinger and Studlar, 1992). 
  As Europe grapples with the balance of power between more centralized European institutions and 
established national institutions, rapid changes in media structures and markets, particularly in the case 
of television, have implications for both old and new political orders.  The traditional hegemony of 
public broadcasting is being challenged by the explosion of new programming made possible by new 
technologies.  The five countries in this study range across three models for the relationship between 
television and politics discussed by Kelly (1983).  She described Britain as an example of a relatively autonomous broadcasting system, Germany and Denmark as "politics- in-broadcasting" systems with 
political parties and significant  
social groups represented, and Italy and France as examples of countries where government has the 
power to intervene directly in broadcasting (Kelly 1983).  New technologies challenge the 
media/informational structures of all these countries and raise questions about how to protect the 
"vulnerable values" of public broadcasting (Blumler 1992). 
 
A Note on the Use of Ordinary Least Squares Regression 
 
The next section describes an OLS regression model in which the Knowledge of the European 
Community Index was regressed on variables known to affect political information.  Although some 
scholars call for recursive models to assess the process by which people learn about politics (Luskin 
1990 provides the most detailed justification), difficulties in estimating two-stage- least squares 
regression on secondary survey data (Smith 1989) led us to estimate nonrecursive models using 
ordinary least squares (OLS) regression.  
OLS regression is a robust data analysis technique which is appropriate even when the data do not 
meet all the model's assumptions (Cohen and Cohen 1983).  The independent variables for the 
information and support models are of three types: natural dichotomies, true interval scales, or ordinal-
level variables coded as closely as possible to interval-level scales.   The dependent variable for the 
knowledge models depicted in Table 1 is an index derived from six questions on Eurobarometer 37 
tapping awareness and knowledge about the EC (see Appendix). The dependent variable for the 
support models shown in Table 2 is the "Support for the European Parliament Index," which is derived 
from three items asked on Eurobarometer 37 (see Appendix for details).  The "Knowledge of European 
Community Index" ranges from 1 to 11, while the "Support for the European Parliament Index" ranges 
from 3 to 9. 
Some data analysts might question whether, given dependent variables such as these, OLS regression 
should be employed.  We believe it can.  As Borgatta and Bohrnstadt noted (1981, 29), since social 
science measurement is crude, most of our observed variables are "imperfect interval-level scales."  
Moreover,since most of the central constructs of the social sciences are conceptualized as continuous, 
and their distributions are such that the application of parametric statistics to their analyses will not 
result in seriously biased estimates. 
 
In short, even if the dependent variable is not normally distributed, the departure from normality 
constitutes more a nuisance than a serious problem, and OLS regression can still be profitably 
employed. 
Finally, residuals for each of the models described in tables 1 and 2 indicate no egregious violations of 
the OLS regression model's key assumptions. 
 
 
Data Analyses 
 
 
Knowledge of European Community 
  The Knowledge of European Community Index was regressed on ten variables known to affect 
political information (see Baker et al. 1994):  age, gender, education, occupation, family income, 
partisanship, general political interest, and three measures of  
reliance on the mass media for information about public affairs-- newspapers, television, and radio (see 
Table 1).  In addition, the models include a measure of ideological orientation.  They also include two 
measures of general orientation to the European Community, perception of its importance (EC Aware) 
and support for European integration (EC Support). 
  The Knowledge of European Community Index was constructed from five factual items, a self-
assessment of the respondent's level of information about the EC, and whether the respondent had 
recently heard anything about the European Parliament (see Appendix for details).  Although the Index 
could range from 1 to 11, the national means ranged from Britain's 4.98 to Denmark's 6.18, with 
Germany at 6.09, France at 5.44 and Italy at 5.24. 
 Table 1:  Predicting Citizen Knowledge of the European Community 
 
     Denmark France       Germany 
        b (se b)           b (se b)            b (se b) 
 
Age     -.01  (.00)**  .01  (.00)**  .01  (.00)* 
Gender     .51  (.11)***  .48  (.12)***  .95  (.14)*** 
Education      .02 (.05) .06 (.09) .27 (.08)*** 
Occupation      .02 (.02) .01 (.03) .04 (.02) 
Income     .03  (.02)  .05  (.02)**  .02  (.02) 
Radio News      .10 (.04)*  .08 (.04)*  .11 (.06)* 
TV  News    -.08  (.08) .16  (.06)**  -.02  (.10) 
Newspaper      .27 (.04)***  .11 (.04)**  .29 (.06)*** 
Political Interest    .62 (.09)*** .42  (.09)*** .68  (.11)*** 
Ideology    .04  (.03)  .03  (.04)  -.03  (.04) 
Party Affiliation 
  Venstre/UDF/FDP  -.90 (.36)**  .00 (.24) .78 (.46) 
  SocFolk/PCF/    -.75 (.90)  -.32 (.30)  --- 
  Conserv/RPR/CDU  -.39 (.40)  .23 (.22) .15 (.18) 
  SocialDem/PS/SPD  -.11 (.13)  -.20 (.19)  .11 (.18) 
Ecol/Green    ---   .04  (.20)  .83  (.29)** 
EC Aware      .43 (.07)***  .28 (.07)***  .49 (.08)*** 
EC Support      .07 (.04)**  .14 (.05)**  .12 (.06)* 
----------------------------------------------------------------- 
Adjusted  R2  =    .25   .19   .36 
S.E.E.      =      1.47    1.57    1.70 
(N  =  )     (847)   (712)   (739) 
----------------------------------------------------------------- 
Source:  Eurobarometer 37 
 
 
Table 1:  Predicting Citizen Knowledge of the European Community 
   (continued) 
 
     Great  Britain    Italy   
        b (se b)            b (se b) 
 
Age     .01  (.00)*  -.01  (.00) 
Gender     .80  (.13)***  .34  (.16)* 
Education    .34  (.10)***  .41  (.10)*** 
Occupation    -.01  (.02) .02  (.03)   
Income     .05  (.02)**  .05  (.03) 
Radio News      .22 (.04)***  .05 (.05) 
TV News      .09 (.09) .27 (.11)*   
Newspaper    .01  (.04)  .29  (.06)*** 
Political Interest    .51 (.11)*** .55  (.12)*** 
Ideology      .02 (.04) -.01 (.05)      
Party Affiliation 
  LibDem/PRI    .67 (.29)*  .93 (.24)* 
  Communist   ---   .06  (.25) 
  Conserv/DC    .45 (.18)**  .16 (.21)  
  Labour/PS    .34 (.17)*        -.17 (.27)   
 Nationalist/LL    -.34  (.58)  .10  (.68) 
  MSI     ---   -.31  (.42)  
EC  Aware    .27  (.08)***  .24  (.09)** 
EC  Support    .05  (.05)  .23  (.09)* ----------------------------------------------------------------- 
Adjusted  R2  =    .28   .34    
S.E.E.      =      1.53    1.73        
(N  =  )     (632)   (551)          
----------------------------------------------------------------- 
Source:  Eurobarometer 37 
 
  Table 1 depicts each independent variable's unstandardized regression coefficient, its standard 
error (in parentheses), the level of significance achieved by each predictor (based on a two- tailed test), 
and the number of cases on which the OLS model was estimated.  The table also depicts two indicators 
of model fit: the adjusted R2 and the standard error of the estimate (S.E.E.).7 
  Inspection of the data from the five countries highlights four results.  First, almost all the 
predictors demonstrated some relevance for understanding citizens' knowledge of the EC. Second, two 
predictors turned out not to be relevant; neither occupation nor ideology achieved statistical 
significance in any  
country.  The result for occupation is surprising, because in earlier research we had found it to matter 
for citizen knowledge of the national legislature in Britain and Canada (Baker et al. 1994).  It may be 
that the occupation measure is simply too general to capture nuances such as workers in firms involved 
in international trade versus those who are not.  We had believed that ideological orientation may 
shape motivation to acquire information about the EC, e.g., someone whose belief systems asserts that 
the EC is not very important would have no incentive to acquire information about it.  Perhaps it does, 
but EC orientations may simply cut across the left-right ideological indicator that we used. 
  Third, a small number of predictors were quite powerful across all the countries.  Most important 
among these was political interest.  Indeed, we expected this because of the well-established role of 
interest in generating people's desire to follow public affairs and acquire information about them. 
Those who perceived that the EC was important for the future of their country were also likely to be 
more knowledgeable.  Given the widespread recognition of the EC's importance ("important" was the 
mean response across all countries to the question of whether EC matters were "very important", 
"important", "not very important" or "not at all important" for our country's future), it is of interest that 
apparently only small differences in the recognized importance of the EC generate significant 
differences in knowledge. The power of gender difference is greater than we  
anticipated.  Paradoxically, it is least strong in Italy where traditional cultural images suggest it might 
have the greatest power.  Age and general support for the European Community achieved significance 
across four of the countries, but they contributed only modestly to the overall explanatory power of our 
model. 
  The fourth feature of our results is the wide variation in the importance of some predictors across 
the five nations.  We take this to be evidence of the continuing significance of differences in national 
political cultures and institutional structures.  Two media use indicators fall into this category. While 
listening to news on radio achieves significance in every case but Italy, it is a robust predictor in 
Britain.   Newspaper readership is important in the Danish, German and Italian cases. But no common 
underlying reason is readily apparent.  The mean frequency of reported readership is lowest in Italy, 
highest in Germany and second highest in Denmark.0   Furthermore, there is growing uncertainty 
about the assumption that, of all media usage, reading newspapers is most likely to instill knowledge 
(Price and Zaller 1993).   Watching television news had an impact on knowledge in France and Italy, 
the two countries in this study that permit the most direct intervention into broadcasting by the state 
(Kelly 1983). 
  Education is the second most important predictor in Britain and Italy.  It also is significant in 
Germany, but it fails to appear in Denmark and France.  This may be explained by national  
differences in the structure of educational opportunity.  Denmark and France have the highest mean 
levels of education and they have a longer history of wider access to higher education. Higher levels of 
education create both more opportunities and more incentives to acquire political information.  Recall, 
that Danes had the highest mean knowledge score while the French were third.  The remaining 
standard SES indicator, income, contributes modestly in the French and British cases, but not at all in 
the others. 
  Partisanship crops up as a factor in four countries, but its impact is modest and limited to one party 
in three of the four: the Danish Venstre who appear ill-informed, the German Greens (well-informed) and the Italian Republicans (well-informed). Three parties appear in Britain, two of the major; in each 
case partisanship is linked to being better informed. 
  Overall, the thirteen predictors account for an average of 28.4% of the variance in the Knowledge 
of the European Community Index.  However, there are substantial national variations in the adjusted 
R2s and the S.E.E.s.  Our model appears reasonably satisfactory for the German and Italian cases, but 
less so for Britain and Denmark, and marginal for France.  However, given several known sources of 
measurement error and possible mis- specification of the model in one or two countries, we believe 
have a reasonably good understanding of the factors responsible for European citizens' level of 
knowledge of the EC.  
 
 
Support for the European Parliament 
 
  
  In this OLS regression model a Support for the European Parliament Index was regressed on the 
same set of variables as in the knowledge model.  The only change was the addition of the Knowledge 
Index score for each respondent.  The Support of the European Parliament Index was constructed from 
a series of three Eurobarometer 37 items (see Appendix for details).  The first was the respondent's 
judgment of the importance of the EP in the life of the EC.  The second was the respondent's judgment 
of whether the EP should play a more important role.  The final element of the index was whether the 
respondent favored the EP having an equal voice with the Council of Ministers in enacting European 
legislation . 
  The potential range of scores on the index was 3 to 9. National means ranged from Denmark's 6.26 
to Italy's 7.73 with France at 7.18, Germany at 6.86 and Great Britain at 6.68.  As in the case of the 
Knowledge Index, the Support Index scores cluster near the mid-point of their potential range, but they 
are somewhat more widely disbursed (1.47 points as opposed to 1.20 points even with a narrower 
scale). 
 
Table 2:  Predicting Citizen Support of the European Parliament 
 
 
     Denmark   France   Germany 
        b  (se b)           b   (se b)       b  (se b) 
 
Age            .01 (.00)       -.00 (.00)  .00 (.00) 
Gender            -.11 (.11)   .08 (.10)  .12 (.12)   
Education          -.03 (.01)**  -.03 (.02)*  -.07 (.07) 
Occupation           .01 (.03) .03 (.02) .01 (.02) 
Income     -.00  (.02) -.00  (.01) .02  (.02) 
Radio  News    -.12  (.05)*  .05  (.03)  -.01  (.05) 
TV  News    -.05  (.09) .04  (.05)  -.14  (.09) 
Newspaper      -.02 (.06)  .03 (.03) -.08 (.06)   
Political Interest    -.06 (.10) -.02  (.07) -.02(.10)     
Ideology    .00  (.03)  -.04  (.03) -.07  (.03)* 
Party Affiliation 
  Venstre/UDF/FDP      .20 (.39) .17 (.18) -.33(.39) 
 SocFolk/PCF/    .46  (1.13)  -.60  (.22)**  --- 
  Conserv/RPR/CDU  .02 (.38) .05 (.17) .10(.16) 
  SocialDem/PS/SPD  -.12 (.15)  -.23 (.15)  -.06(.15) 
  Ecol/Green   ---   -.15  (.15) .40  (.24)   
EC Aware      .18 (.08)*  .20 (.06)**  .41 (.08)*** 
EC  Support    .48  (.04)***  .38  (.04)***  .43(.05)*** 
Know  EC    .02  (.04)  -.00  (.03) .11  (.03)*** 
---------------------------------------------------------------- 
Adjusted  R2    =    .24   .23   .33 
S.E.E.        =     1.26    .99    1.26 (N=  )     (549)   (485)   (523) 
----------------------------------------------------------------- 
Note:  * p=.05; ** p=.01; and *** p=.001 
Source:  Eurobarometer 37 
 
Table 2:  Predicting Citizen Support of the European Parliament 
   (continued) 
 
        Great Britain          Italy   
        b   (se b)            b   (se b)      
 
Age       -.01 (.00)         .00 (.00) 
Gender     -.27  (.13)*  .12  (.10)       
Education    .02  (.09)  -.11  (.06)* 
Occupation    .00  (.02)  .02  (.02)   
Income     .01  (.02)  -.02  (.02)     
Radio  News    .03  (.04)  -.00  (.03) 
TV News      -.01 (.09)  -.02 (.09)  
Newspaper    .01  (.04)  .03  (.04) 
Political Interest    -.10 (.10)  -.04 (.07) 
Ideology    .02  (.04)  .05  (.03)*     
Party Affiliation 
 LibDem/Repub          -.00 (.28)    .04 (.20)  
 Communist          ---    .19 (.15)  
  Conserv/DC    -.34  (.18) .24  (.13)   
 Labour/Socialist    .16 (.17) .06 (.17)  
  MSI     ---   .15  (.25)   
 Nationalist/LL      -.49 (.50)  -.88 (.35)** 
EC  Aware    .20  (.08)*  .23  (.07)*** 
EC  Support    .44  (.05)***  .22  (.06)*** 
Know  EC    .00  (.04)  .04  (.03) 
---------------------------------------------------------------- 
Adjusted  R2      =    .23   .14      
S.E.E.        =     1.25    .89     
(N=  )     (444)   (385)   
----------------------------------------------------------------- 
Note:  * p=.05; ** p=.01; and *** p=.001 
Source:  Eurobarometer 37 
 
  As in Table 1, Table 2 depicts each predictor variable's unstandardized regression coefficient, its 
standard error (in parentheses), the level of significance achieved by each predictor (based on a two-
tailed test), and the number of cases on which the OLS model was estimated.  The table also depicts 
two  
indicators of model fit:  the adjusted R2 and the standard error of the estimate (S.E.E.). 
  Perhaps the most striking finding is that six of our fourteen predictors failed to achieve 
significance in any country; these were: age, occupation, income, watching the news on TV, 
newspaper reading and political interest.  We explore some of the implications of this fact in our 
concluding section.  At the other extreme, only two predictors reached significance in all five countries:  
EC support and awareness of the importance of the EC.  EC support also was the most powerful 
predictor in four of the five cases.  The exception was Italy where it was just bested by awareness of 
the EC's importance. 
  The remaining six predictors played some role in at least one country, but there was little apparent 
pattern to their roles.  Education was the only SES variable to appear as a significant predictor of 
support.  It did so, but modestly, in Denmark, France and Italy.  However, in each case its sign was 
negative indicating that the less well educated were more likely to support the EP than their better 
educated fellow citizens. Ideology was significant in Germany and Italy, but the direction of its impact differed.  In Germany, support was associated with being to the left, while in Italy it was associated 
with being to the right.  Partisanship mattered in only two instances: for French Communists and 
Italian supporters of the Lombard League. In both these cases, party identifiers tended to be hostile 
toward the EP. 
  
  A media predictor (frequency of listening to news on the radio) reached sigificance only in 
Denmark.  Gender was the second most important predictor in Britain but--contrary to the findings for 
knowledge--support was greater among women. Knowledge level was a significant predictor of 
support only in Germany. 
  The general picture emerging from this test of our support model is that support for the European 
Parliament is not grounded in social or political structures nor is it likely to be enhanced by media 
exposure.  In four of the five countries, our knowledge index failed to achieve significance as a 
predictor of support for the EP.  Rather support for the EP is an extension of an attitude set among the 
segment of the population who see the European Community as important to the future of their country, 
and who are generally supportive of European integration. 
  Overall, this model performs less well than the knowledge model.  The fourteen predictors 
account for an average of 23.4% of the variance in the Support for the European Parliament Index. 
Again, there are substantial national variations in the adjusted R2s and the S.E.E.s.  Our model is 
satisfactory for the Germany. But it does less well for France Britain and Denmark, and performs 
poorly in the Italian case. 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
 
  Early in this paper we posed a series of questions about the knowledge-support relationship and 
EC affairs in the eyes of citizens of EC member states.  We asked whether the same factors  
affect knowledge across member states.  We found that some-- general political interest, EC awareness, 
EC support, gender and information sources--do.  But each country's model highlights distinctive 
factors as well.  
  We asked whether support for the European Parliament rests on a solid base of knowledge, and 
assumed parliamentary legitimacy would be better served if it did.  We have found, that with the 
significant German exception, support does not rest on knowledge.  Two country cases further 
illustrate the failure of the knowledge-support connection evident in the regression models.  Danes 
registered the highest mean knowledge score but the lowest mean support score; Italians the next to 
lowest knowledge score and the highest support score. 
  We conclude that support is a function of general disposition toward the EC which is unrelated to 
knowledge.  Nor does it appear that support for the EP is linked to particular segments of the 
population.  We find no evidence of a "youth brigade" for the EP just as others have found reason 
recently to question whether young people are more supportive of European integration generally 
(Rattinger, 1994, 526; Janssen 1991, 463). Having a higher level of education is not positively 
associated with support; where education is a significant predictor its sign is negative.  Nor do we find 
evidence that those in higher status occupations are more likely to support the EP.  Reliance on 
particular media for news bears almost no relationship to support. 
  
  Finally, even partisanship is a marginal influence.  Perhaps this is because EC issues increasingly 
divide parties internally. However, Rattinger (1994) has found that in Germany attitudes toward 
European integration are polarized by party preference, but with the proviso that those who identify 
with the older parties are more supportive of integration--but declining in numbers--while supporters 
of newer parties (e.g. Republikaner) are more skeptical. 
  Our findings suggest a daunting prospect for those who hope to strengthen public support for the 
European Parliament as a means to closing the democratic deficit.  There is no readily identifiable 
social base to appeal to and the old partisan support bases may be eroding.  Our results offer no basis 
for strategies which would stress the use of one type of media outlet to strengthen support.  Nor do 
they offer support for a strategy which seeks to increase knowledge as a means of gaining support. 
However, the German exception calls out for further study.   We see several implications in the results of this analysis for future work.  In addition to refining 
our models and measures, we would like to extend our approach to other countries and other surveys 
with the goals of including a wider range of cross-sectional cases and time series comparisons.   Much 
remains to be explained when attempting to account for citizen support for the European Parliament.   
 
 
Appendix 
 
 
Construction of the "Knowledge of European Community Index" 
Eurobarometer 37 asked five knowledge questions.  Four concerned the location of the principal EC 
institutions:  the Commission, the Parliament, the Council of Ministers and the Court of Justice.  
(Respondents were much more likely to answer the first two correctly.)  A fifth item asked which 
institution held the final authority for decisions.  Most respondents were inclined to answer--
incorrectly--that it was Parliament rather than the Council.  Knowledge questions were coded 0 if the 
respondent answered incorrectly and 1 if the answer was correct. These questions were supplemented 
with an item in which respondents were asked to rate themselves as to how well informed they thought 
they were on European Community affairs.  This item yielded a five point scale ranging from 
"uninformed" to "very well informed."  The last item in the index was whether the respondent recently 
had heard anything in the media about the European Parliament, coded 0 if "no" and 1 if "yes".  Index 
scores were created by adding the individual item scores; the index thus constructed yielded an 11 
point scale and scores could range from 1 to 11.  The blending of objective and subjective indicators 
may be questioned, but it is not unreasonable to assume that both types of indicators contribute to a 
sense of "civic competence" in EC affairs. 
 
 
 
Construction of the "Support for the European Parliament Index" 
The Index was constructed from three items in Eurobarometer 37. The first asked the respondent's 
perception of the importance of the European Parliament in the life of the EC with a four point scale of 
choices.  The second asked whether the respondent would prefer to see the powers of the EP increase 
and yielded a three point scale.  The third asked whether the Parliament should be given joint decision 
authority with the Council; this item was coded 1 for "not favor" and 2 for "favor". Index scores were 
created by adding the individual item scores; they could range from 3 to 9.  Mean scores by nation 
were Denmark (6.26), Britain (6.68), Germany (6.86), France (7.18) and Italy (7.73). 
 
Table 1:  Predicting Citizen Knowledge of the European Community 
 
     Denmark France       Germany 
        b (se b)           b (se b)            b (se b) 
 
Age     -.01  (.00)**  .01  (.00)**  .01  (.00)* 
Gender     .51  (.11)***  .48  (.12)***  .95  (.14)*** 
Education      .02 (.05) .06 (.09) .27 (.08)*** 
Occupation      .02 (.02) .01 (.03) .04 (.02) 
Income     .03  (.02)  .05  (.02)**  .02  (.02) 
Radio News      .10 (.04)*  .08 (.04)*  .11 (.06)* 
TV  News    -.08  (.08) .16  (.06)**  -.02  (.10) 
Newspaper      .27 (.04)***  .11 (.04)**  .29 (.06)*** 
Political Interest    .62 (.09)*** .42  (.09)*** .68  (.11)*** 
Ideology    .04  (.03)  .03  (.04)  -.03  (.04) 
Party Affiliation 
  Venstre/UDF/FDP  -.90 (.36)**  .00 (.24) .78 (.46) 
  SocFolk/PCF/    -.75 (.90)  -.32 (.30)  --- 
  Conserv/RPR/CDU  -.39 (.40)  .23 (.22) .15 (.18) 
  SocialDem/PS/SPD  -.11 (.13)  -.20 (.19)  .11 (.18) Ecol/Green    ---   .04  (.20)  .83  (.29)** 
EC Aware      .43 (.07)***  .28 (.07)***  .49 (.08)*** 
EC Support      .07 (.04)**  .14 (.05)**  .12 (.06)* 
----------------------------------------------------------------- 
Adjusted  R2  =    .25   .19   .36 
S.E.E.      =      1.47    1.57    1.70 
(N  =  )     (847)   (712)   (739) 
----------------------------------------------------------------- 
Source:  Eurobarometer 37 
 
 
Table 1:  Predicting Citizen Knowledge of the European Community 
   (continued) 
 
     Great  Britain    Italy   
        b (se b)            b (se b) 
 
Age     .01  (.00)*  -.01  (.00) 
Gender     .80  (.13)***  .34  (.16)* 
Education    .34  (.10)***  .41  (.10)*** 
Occupation    -.01  (.02) .02  (.03)   
Income     .05  (.02)**  .05  (.03) 
Radio News      .22 (.04)***  .05 (.05) 
TV News      .09 (.09) .27 (.11)*   
Newspaper    .01  (.04)  .29  (.06)*** 
Political Interest    .51 (.11)*** .55  (.12)*** 
Ideology      .02 (.04) -.01 (.05)      
Party Affiliation 
  LibDem/PRI    .67 (.29)*  .93 (.24)* 
  Communist   ---   .06  (.25) 
  Conserv/DC    .45 (.18)**  .16 (.21)  
  Labour/PS    .34 (.17)*        -.17 (.27)   
 Nationalist/LL    -.34  (.58)  .10  (.68) 
  MSI     ---   -.31  (.42)  
EC  Aware    .27  (.08)***  .24  (.09)** 
EC  Support    .05  (.05)  .23  (.09)* 
----------------------------------------------------------------- 
Adjusted  R2  =    .28   .34    
S.E.E.      =      1.53    1.73        
(N  =  )     (632)   (551)          
----------------------------------------------------------------- 
Source:  Eurobarometer 37 
 
Table 2:  Predicting Citizen Support of the European Parliament 
 
 
     Denmark   France   Germany 
        b  (se b)           b   (se b)       b  (se b) 
 
Age            .01 (.00)       -.00 (.00)  .00 (.00) 
Gender            -.11 (.11)   .08 (.10)  .12 (.12)   
Education          -.03 (.01)**  -.03 (.02)*  -.07 (.07) 
Occupation           .01 (.03) .03 (.02) .01 (.02) 
Income     -.00  (.02) -.00  (.01) .02  (.02) 
Radio  News    -.12  (.05)*  .05  (.03)  -.01  (.05) 
TV  News    -.05  (.09) .04  (.05)  -.14  (.09) Newspaper      -.02 (.06)  .03 (.03) -.08 (.06)   
Political Interest    -.06 (.10) -.02  (.07) -.02(.10)     
Ideology    .00  (.03)  -.04  (.03) -.07  (.03)* 
Party Affiliation 
  Venstre/UDF/FDP      .20 (.39) .17 (.18) -.33(.39) 
 SocFolk/PCF/    .46  (1.13)  -.60  (.22)**  --- 
  Conserv/RPR/CDU  .02 (.38) .05 (.17) .10(.16) 
  SocialDem/PS/SPD  -.12 (.15)  -.23 (.15)  -.06(.15) 
  Ecol/Green   ---   -.15  (.15) .40  (.24)   
EC Aware      .18 (.08)*  .20 (.06)**  .41 (.08)*** 
EC  Support    .48  (.04)***  .38  (.04)***  .43(.05)*** 
Know  EC    .02  (.04)  -.00  (.03) .11  (.03)*** 
---------------------------------------------------------------- 
Adjusted  R2    =    .24   .23   .33 
S.E.E.        =     1.26    .99    1.26 
(N=  )     (549)   (485)   (523) 
----------------------------------------------------------------- 
Note:  * p=.05; ** p=.01; and *** p=.001 
Source:  Eurobarometer 37 
 
Table 2:  Predicting Citizen Support of the European Parliament 
   (continued) 
 
        Great Britain          Italy   
        b   (se b)            b   (se b)      
 
Age       -.01 (.00)         .00 (.00) 
Gender     -.27  (.13)*  .12  (.10)       
Education    .02  (.09)  -.11  (.06)* 
Occupation    .00  (.02)  .02  (.02)   
Income     .01  (.02)  -.02  (.02)     
Radio  News    .03  (.04)  -.00  (.03) 
TV News      -.01 (.09)  -.02 (.09)  
Newspaper    .01  (.04)  .03  (.04) 
Political Interest    -.10 (.10)  -.04 (.07) 
Ideology    .02  (.04)  .05  (.03)*     
Party Affiliation 
 LibDem/Repub          -.00 (.28)    .04 (.20)  
 Communist          ---    .19 (.15)  
  Conserv/DC    -.34  (.18) .24  (.13)   
 Labour/Socialist    .16 (.17) .06 (.17)  
  MSI     ---   .15  (.25)   
 Nationalist/LL      -.49 (.50)  -.88 (.35)** 
EC  Aware    .20  (.08)*  .23  (.07)*** 
EC  Support    .44  (.05)***  .22  (.06)*** 
Know  EC    .00  (.04)  .04  (.03) 
---------------------------------------------------------------- 
Adjusted  R2      =    .23   .14      
S.E.E.        =     1.25    .89     
(N=  )     (444)   (385)   
----------------------------------------------------------------- 
Note:  * p=.05; ** p=.01; and *** p=.001 
Source:  Eurobarometer 37   
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